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Where is Africa going? Cannibalism in Stanleyville, Chinese in
Brazzaville, Russian guns in the Ccngo, assassinations, coups d'etat,
crises without number--is Africa lurching back toward what Joseph Conrad
called the "black shadows of disease and starvation, lying confusedly in
the greenish gloom"? Can the United States safely forget about Africa,
since the Russians and Chinese will get -no farther there than we have?
Or must we try to contain Moscow and Peking in Africa by aiding our
friends and checking theirs as we do in East Asia and Latin America?
Africa:, Another Central America?
For better or for worse, except for the southern African White
Redoubt--Portuguese Angola and. Moztambique, Rhodeia, and South Africa--
Arab and black Africa are independent; and most African states became
independent before the y had, ough economic and social stability and
trained politica '.ites to guard their new freedomn This was true of
Central and, South America in the 182 s, -a, there, as with Africa now,
the West's initi.al hope for stabiit seemed increasingly to give way to
slaughter and anarchy, In Africa, with the partial. exception of Nigeria
and Zambia, democracy does not seem to c finding roots. One-party,
dictatorial, regJmes are the rul, and cvi liberties and. the rule of
law increasingl.y the exception, th+rcughouit the Dark Continent.
The President of Togo was assassinated by 60 disgruntled ex-soldiers.
The newly-independent African governments in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika
were only saved from grave danger arising from mutinies by their troops
as a result of the humiliating if temporary return of British troops. A
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few hundred rebels overthrew the government of Zanzibar. Since 1960 the
Congo has been swept by anarchy and drenched in blood by scattered rebel
bands, and even more by its own undisciplined troops.
If history were merely repeating itself, we could be as indifferent
to African anarchy today as we were to Central American anarchy a century
ago. But there is one simple and crucial difference between Latin America's
past and Africa's present: the Monroe Doctrine, which with the British
fleet prevented any European power from expanding in Latin America--until
we foolishly allowed Castro's Cuba to become a Soviet military base.
Similarly, the British and French, by winning two world wars (with our
aid) prevented their enemies--Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia--from
maintaining major power positions in Africa.
But World War II so weakened its British and French victors that they
felt compelled to give in to the world-wide wave of anti- colonialism and
to withdraw, more or less peacefully, from their African colonies. The
United States encouraged them to do so; but even if we had tried to stop
their retreat, they would probably have left eventually. Nor have they
been prepared since to enforce anything like a European Monroe Doctrine
for Africa--anymore than, with the partial exception of the Congo, we have.
Moreover independent black Africa is an exposed power vacuum. With
the partial exception of the Algerian and. Egyptian armies and air forces,
both largely armed and trained by Moscow, the black African states have
no military power worthy of the name. Africa therefore was no longer
barred to Soviet and Chinese penetration,
Russia and China in Africa
In Africa (as in Latin America) Soviet and Chinese penetration has
become significant only since Moscow and Peking have become bitter enemies,
engaged in world-wide competition with each other as well as with the West.
Chinese expansionism in Africa is directed as much against Soviet as against
American or West European influence, and the Russians have therefore felt
compelled to intensify their own African operations. Furthermore, dealing
with radical non-Communists Africans has become the easier for both Moscow
and Peking because their competition for allies, Communist or not, has
increasingly eroded their remaining ideological scruples against dealing
with non-Communists. Therefore, since there are few disciplined Communists
and hardly any Communist parties in Africa, both Soviet and Chinese efforts
in Africa are directed at radical (but not officially Communist) African
states and opposition movements,
It is difficult to estimate the extent and seriousness of Soviet and
Chinese penetration in Africa. Both Moscow and- Peking have considerable
influence on, although they dc not dominate, such radical African states
as Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. They are
acquiring increasing influence in Kenya and Tanzania. The Chinese are the
most influential foreign power in Brazzaville, and they have aided (as,
via Algiers and Cairo, have the Soviets) the Congolese rebels. Moscow has
out-trumped Peking in arms aid to Somaliland. Finally, while the exile
African nationalist rebel groups from the White Redoubt were originally
divided into pro-Soviet and anti-Communist elements now, because of
frustration, lack of Western support, and the rising power of the whites
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to the south, they are increasingly split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking
wings.
A Case Study: The Congo
In Africa, the United States is most involved in the Congo. Un-
like the British and French, the Belgians there trained hardly any
Africans for positions of responsibility; and when in 1960 they pre-
cipitously withdrew, there was neither political structure nor per-
sonnel to stop the Congo from reverting to tribal war and anarchy.
Furthermore, Belgian (and British) support for, plus lack of United
Nations and American opposition to, Tschombe's copper-rich Katanga
secession (which would have made the Congo economically unviable),
plus his own radicalism, immaturity, and drive for power, persuaded
the Congo's first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, to accept Soviet
assistanc e. After Lumumba was murdered, probably with Tschombe's
complicity, his associate Gizenga, who still had some Soviet support,
inherited Lumumba's claim to be the only true Congolese nationalist
and set up a rebel government in Stanleyville to oppose Lumumba's
successor Adoula in Leopoldville. Thereupon President Kennedy finally
decided that, in order to get rid of Gizenga and the Russians, Tschombe
must go. The United Nations force then crushed Tschombe, whereupon
Gizenga immediately fell, Soviet influence in the Congo declined to
near-zero, Adoula's central government stabilized., and America's
prestige, because it had crushed Tschombe, reached a new high in
black Africa.
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But all this turned out to be only a temporary lull, primarily
because the United Nations withdrew from Leopoldville in late 1963.
Thereupon rebellions, basically tribal in nature, again broke out
in the east and southwest Congo. The rebel leaders sought Communist
aid to withstand the Congolese government and its American protectors.
This time the Chinese, not the Russians, initially seemed to be support-
ing the rebels--not, as Moscow had Lumumba, with transport planes, but
with money, training, and advice. The leader of the southwest Congo
revolt, Mulele, had just returned from two years in Peking. Other
rebel leaders, notably Ghenye and Soumaliot also received some aid
from the Chinese. They got more, though, from the radical African
states, notably arms aid from Adlgeria and the UAR, who in turn received
new arms from Moscow, which rapidly decided not to be overshadowed by
the Chinese in aid to Congolese rad icalism.
Meanwhile, with the United Nations departure impending, Congolese
President Kasavubu and his Close associates Generals Mobutu and Nendaka
had concluded that only Tschombe, who, with support from Belgian economic
interests, was intriguing from Madrid to get back to the Congo, had the
ability and ruthlessness needed to suppress the rebellion. They there-
fore made a deal with him, in which the Americans were not involved and
of which they were largely unaware, to return as Prime Minister,
Tschombe immediately began hiring white South African mercenaries,
recalling his Belgian advisers, and fighting the rebels.
The United States thereupon faced a major policy choice. If it
supported Tschombe, it would lose the ground Kennedy had gained in
black Africa by suppressing Tschombe's Katanga rebellion, If it did
not, and Tschombe fell, there would be at best chaos and at worst a
government in Leopoldville favorable to the Russians or the Chinese.
Washington therefore chose Tschombe, and sent him some U. S. planes
and some anti-Castro Cuban pilots. The Americans have also tried to
persuade him to get some non-South African mercenaries, but with little
decisiveness and less success. American support of Tschombe continued
until by the spring of 1965 be had increased his diplomatic support
among the moderate African states and his white South African mercenaries
had scored increasing successes against the rebels. Meanwhile the
rebel massacres in Stanleyville had led to American transport planes
and Belgian paratroops coming in to save the remaining white hostages,
whereupon Tschombe's white mercenaries and Congolese troops massacred
most of the remaining rebels.
Who has won in the Congo? Certainly not the Congolese: parts of
the Congo have returned to tribal barbarism. Hardly the United States,
except insofar as it has prevented a Russian or Chinese-influenced
government from coming to power in Lecpoldville. As for Moscow and
Peking, although they seem at the moment to be losing in the Congo
itself, the Chinese have gained. great influence in Brazzaville, and
both they and the Russians, because of African hosility to American
support of Tschombe, have acquired more influence in the radical
African states.
The biggest winners of all, though, are the states that make up
the White Redoubt: Verwoerd's South Africa, Salazar's Angola and
Mozambique, and Ian Smith's Rhodesia. Their mercenaries, supported
by American planes, are breaking the Congolese rebellion. Tschombe
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prefers to coexist with them rather than to fight them, and discourages
rebellions against them based on Congolese territory. America, appalled
by the rise of pro-Communist radicalism in Africa, is now less likely
than ever to support African rebellions against them. In the long run,
insofar as our support of Tschoidbe contributes to the radicalization
of the rest of Africa, Moscow and perhaps also Peking will probably
profit even more.
Southwest Africa: A Crisis to Come?
The Congo's problems will be with us for a long time to come.
Another potentially more serious crisis is looming on the horizon: It
will be touched off, if it occurs, by the decision of the International
Court of Justice in The Hague, expected this autumn, concerning the
South African mandate over Southwest Africa. Until 1918 a German
colony, Southwest Africa then became a South African mandate under
the League of Nations, a legal status that, as the Court has already
ruled, continues under the United Nations. Liberia and Ethopia, the
only African League members, have sued for a Court ruling that South
Africa's apartheid policy i. Southwest Africa has violated the man-
date. Most experts expect the Court to rule against South Africa.
If ani when it does, it will be up to the United Nations Security
Council to take whatever action it deems necessary to enforce the
Court's decision.
The Afro-Asian states will surely introduce a resolution, which
Moscow will probably support, demanding that South Africa surrender
the mandate under pain of economic and military sanctions. The United
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States and Britain will then be confronted with a most difficult dilemma.
South Africa may well defy the Court decision and leave the United Nations
if enforcement is attempted. Because South Africa is by far thestrongest
military power on the African continent, only a prolonged American naval
blockade, including the Portuguese territories as well, could bring her
to her knees. Such a blockade might well also produce African revolts in
South Africa, with the resultant necessity of United Nations (if not
United States) intervention.
Moscow might intervene militarily in support of the Afro-Asians on
this issue. France would probably veto any Security Council resolution
for intervention. The issue would then go to the General Assembly,
where the Afro-Asians would try to get a United Nations peace-keeping
force set up to compel South African compliance. They would probably
prefer United States and British rather than Soviet support, but they
would probably accept the latter if necessary if only to blackmail the
United States into participating,
The Russians, in spite of their opposition to all United Nations
peacekeeping forces and their refusal so far to pay for them, might
well be temptef to participate in this case, for three reasons. First,
the United States and the United Kingdom would be so reluctant to
participate themselves that they would be unlikely to jump in to pre-
vent the Russians froa doing so. Second, if the Russians did join the
force--with enough submarines, say, to blockade South African ports--
the United States and the United Kingdom would be reluctant to block
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the force, saving South Africa and infuriating the Afro-Asians. Third,
China, which is trying to wreck the United Nationas, would want to keep
it out altogether, and therefore Russia might be the more tempted to
get in. On balance it seems doubtful that Russia would come in militarily;
traditional Soviet caution would probably prevail. But we dare not neglect
the danger that they might. In any case, if we allow South Africa to defy
a Court decision with impunity, we shall not only further worsen our own
situation in Africa (and thus aid Russia and China), but we shall also
make a mockery of our advocacy of the rule of law.
Prospects for Africa
Because of rising population, economic stagnation, and political
instability, increasing political radicalization in Africa is probable.
This will weaken pro-Western sympathies and increase Soviet and Chinese
influence in the continent. Externally, Britain and Belgium have with-
drawn, France is doing so in part, and Portugal's internal stability,
uncertain after Salazar, brings the future of her African presence into
question. South Africa, however, becomes more stable, more powerful, and
more ruthlessly repressive every day. Furthermore, South Africa can,
and well may, acquire nuclear weapons, its surest guarantee of successful
defiance of the rest of the world.
Chinese influence in Africa will continue to rise, barring a
major Sino-American conflict. Because of Sino-Soviet competition,
Soviet influence will also rise. Furthermore, South Africa will in-
creasingly frustrate black African nationalist attempts to overcome
the White Redoubt. In many black African states this frustration will
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be translated into more radicalization at home and into search for
arms aid abroad, arms aid which only Russia or China can, and may,
give. Neither Moscow nor Peking is likely to fight South Africa
directly; they will more likely supply just enough arms to African
nationalists to keep the struggle going and to enable them to manipulate
African politics in their favor.
Finally, as racial integration proceeds in the United States,
the leaders of the twenty million American Negroes will increasingly
turn their attention to the African nationalists' faltering struggle
against South Africa. Signs of this have already occurred, but it
will be probably five till ten years before Negro pressure becomes a
major factor in American African policy. When it does, however, it
will have much of the emotion and of the significance of the pressure
of Jewish Americans to aid Israel against the Arabs. It will certaii.ly
be a force which no American government will be able to ignore or
neglect in policy toward Africa.
American National Interests in Africa
Given Africa as it is today, and what we can see of Africa to-
morrow, what are the United States' vital interests there? The
most important one, as elsewhere in the world, is to contain Soviet
and Chinese expansionism:ta leny to either Moscow or Peking dominant
influence over vital areas on the Black Continent, i.e. those where
the acquisition of predominant influence by Moscow or Peking would
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seriously shift the balance of forces in Africa in their favor and
against ours.
Some of these areas are of military and strategic significance--
air bases, communications centers, and so forth--that is, significant
to the Russians or Chinese if they acquired them, not necessarily be-
cause they are significant to us now. One thinks of the large United
States communications facilities in Liberia and Ethiopia, of the huge
air base in Kamina in the Congo, of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the
Suez Canal.
Similarly, such areas may be ones economically vital either to
the West or to the Russians or the Chinese. One thinks of the re-
cently discovered enormous oil reserves in Algeria and Libya, of the
gold, diamonds, and other minerals of South Africa, of the copper of
Katanga and Zambia, and of the uranium of the Congo. As the following
table indicates, Africa is a key supplier of certain important minerals
to the West, the loss of which to either Moscow or Peking would greatly
change the East-West economic balance of power.
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Comparative Percentages of Selected Mineral Production
for Africa,
Non-Communist World, and Communist World
1,962*
Africa
% of World
total
Non-Communist
World
of World
total
Communist
World
of World
total
Antimony ore
Chrome ore
Cobalt ore2
Diamonds3
(gems & industrial)
Diamonds 4
(industrial only)
Gold5
metric
tons
thousand
metric tons
metric
tons
thousand
metric carats
it
Kilograms
20%
23%
71.7%
95,5%
90.2%
73.8%
31%
22%
49%
55%
28. 3%
4.5%
9 8%
unknown
unknown, Soviet
production
substantial
ft
unknown, Soviet
production secret
but very substan-
tial.
Symbols: *Preliminary or estimated figures
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook 1.963
Notes: 1 Excluding Bulgaria, Romania
2 Excluding USSR, Cyprus, Greece, Korea, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Uganda, U.S.
3 1961 figures, excluding USSR, Guinea
4 1961 figures, excluding USSR
5 Excluding USSR, China, Romania
(all Communist countries underlined)
Mineral Unit
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Furthermore, American investments in black Africa are larger
than those in the White Redoubt (Britain's are much greater in
the White Redoubt, a fact which explains why even a Labor government
in London will do little or nothing against Salisbury or Pretoria.)
Finally, there are politically vital areas in Africa, those whose
power, influence, and pro-Western (or at least anti-Eastern) posture
is of political importance to the United States in many aspects of
international affairs, particularly in the United Nations. Perhaps
the best example is Nigeria, the most populous African country, one
of its most pro-Western ones, and one with great influence in the
whole uncommitted world. Moscow or Peking would go to great lengths
to get Nigeria on its side; it is of at least as much importance to
us to prevent this.
To say that America's vital interest in Africa should be to deny
it to Russia or China is anything but a popular view in Africa: almost
all black Africans want only to be let alone, to opt out of great power
rivalries and to pursue their own affairs in peace. This continental
isolationism is a perfectly natural attitude, and it should not seem
strange to us; after all, it was America's foreign policy, except for
World War T, until 1939.
But Africa is not shielded from foreign intervention by any Monroe
Doctrine. Whatever we do in Africa, Russia and China will continue to
intervene there, and radical African states and rebellious African
opposition leaders will continue to invite them in. Isolationism may
be in Africa's interest, but it is only in ours if it works, i.e. if
East as well as West, stays out. Since the East will not, the West
cannot. Unlike Moscow or Peking, we can easily afford to settle for
genuine non-alignment in Africa. We do not need military alliances
with the African states; on the contrary, our own interests in the
Black Continent would best be furthered by excluding it completely
from the Cold War. Nor must or should we try always only to preserve
existing African governments, many of whom will probably not withstand
the agitation of young, frustrated radicals; rather, we should concentrate
on preventing predominant Soviet and Chinese influence over them.
(And we should remember that, as Soviet blunders with Sikou Toure in
Guinea have shown, Communist influence in Africa can be brief and
self-destroying.) Unless and until this can be done by the African
states, with or without our help, we must act ourselves to counter-
balance, check, and. contain Soviet and Chinese efforts to swing
Africa in their direction.
There is one final problem which Africa uniquely presents for
American foreign policy: the danger of racial war. Because of
Communist China's plan to launch this kind of war against us, and
because we are vulnerable at home to racial strife, the United States
must be much more concerned than any other Western power to avoid such
a racial conflict.
Yet a racial war is exactly what in the long run the African
struggle to bring down the White Redoubt Africa may lead to. Not
soon: contrary to the whites' fears and the blacks' hopes, the events
of the last few years have weakened black African nationalism and
strengthened the White Redoubt, Furthermore America's inability and
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unwillingness to date to extricate itself from its unholy alliance
with the white South African mercenaries in the Congo has made many
black African nationalists anti-American because to them Washington
is allied with their white enemies against them.
There are those in the West, in part out of anti-Communist motives,
who feel that our only remaining chance for non-Communist, stable govern-
ments in strategically and economically vital areas in Africa, and,
therefore for American security interests in the continent, lies in
supporting the whites in the south:. Dr. Verwoerd in Pretoria, the
Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, and Ian Smith in Salisbury. In
my view this is a one-sided and short-sighted policy, for three reasons.
First, the Uni ted States cannot be committed to racial integration
at home and to white supremacy in Southern Africa. Were we to try to
be, we would not only drive much of the rest of black Africa and
other under-developed areas as well toward Moscow and Peking, but our
own increas'1rigly powerful Negro minority would. sooner or later wreck
if not reverse such a policy, thus leaving us with the worst of both
worlds.
Secondly, Portugal may well be internally unstable after Salazar's
death, and he is well over 70. We would be unwise therefore to bet
on Portuguese rule continuing Indefinitely in their African possessions.
Rhodesia has 210,000 whites and, 4,000,000 Africans--again, probably too
small a white base for lasting rule.
The Republic of South Africa, however, is a very different story.
The South African whites are powerful, ruthless, wealthy, and fully
capable of obtaining atomic capacity. The blacks are terrorized and
disunited. Verwoerd and his Nationalist Party gain in every election
and are now making great inroads among the English-speaking whites as
well as their own Afrikaners. Left to their own resources, all the
black African states will not be able to defeat South Africa at least
for the next decade; they can do so only by aid from a major foreign
power. It is clearly in the American interest that neither Moscow nor
Peking give such aid.
Thirdly, rising instability in Africa makes it likely that the
Congo cannot soon reacquire anything like stability without continuing
American military and economic aid. We must assume that other, similar
situations will occur in Africa in the future. While our objective
should remain to turn over such peace-keeping operations to a strong
African unity organization not under radical or pro-Communist leader-
ship and not, as the organization of African unity now is, immobilized
by internal strife, thus keeping Moscow and Peking out of African
trouble-spots, it is not likely that this will be possible in the near
future. We must therefore remain prepared to counter Soviet and Chinese
intervention, and we shall probably have to do so in part by military
as well as economic and diplomatic means. We should use military power
sparingly, and insofar as possible not our own alone. But a United
Nations force will not return to the Congo, nor will one probably be
sent anywhere in Africa; so at times we may have to take the initiative
ourselves. We should use economic aid selectively and not steadily
cut it, as we have been doing. (We should also not give economic aid
to such a pro-Communist radical and anti-American state as Ghana.
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Since the black Africans cannot alone overthrow the White Redoubt;
since American public opinion will probably not soon favor, nor will
American vital interests require, American military intervention to do
so; and since we must prevent Soviet or Chinese intervention for this
purpose, we cannot and will not fulfill African nationalist desires.
We must therefore expect continuing hostility from them. On the other
hand, we cannot, for the reasons set forth above, support the White
Redoubt and thus risk losing black Africa entirely to Moscow and Peking.
We will therefore unfortunately but inevitably balance between North
and South, black and white, and at best be unpopular with both.
Specific Policy Problems
1 The Congo. We are saddled with Tschombe and there is no
effective replacement i sight; it therefore remains too risky not
to support him. Yet we need not continue to support him on his terms,
thereby losing influence in tlack Africa and playing into Soviet and
Chinese hands, LUnderstandably, Tschombe does not want to rely only
on us for support; rather, he wants to balance off the United States,
Western Europe, and the White Redoubt against his black nationalist
neighbors and each other, Yet American interests are unnecessarily
damaged by our public association with South African white mercenaries,
who, for black African nationaists are roughly equivalent of Selma,
Alabama police force for Negro civil rights demonstrators. It seems
to be American policy to find some other mercenaries, if possible
black, if not white, than the South African and Rhodesian ones, but
this policy has had no results to date; we should see to it that it does.
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Conversely, we have been too easy on some of the Congo rebellion's
supporters. This is true most of all of Nasser, who has also been
supporting the rebels in the Yemen against the interests of our British
allies and against an increasing majority of the Yemen's inhabitants,
who has feted Ulbricht to the dismay of our West German allies, and who,
finally, is threatening to start another Israeli-Arab conflict. To
continue American aid to Nasser in this context, and to stand by while
he sends in Moscow's arms for Moscow's benefit, is contrary to our
interests. More vigorous moves against him are required.
Finally, with respect to South Africa itself, we must match words
with actions. The longer we preach against Dr. Verwoerd's apartheid
but continue policies which aid his interests, the more rapidly we
drive his African nationalist opponents into the hands of Moscow and
Peking. Furthermore, Dr. Verwoerd needs us more than we need him.
He cannot go over to Moscow or Peking, but the black Africans can, and
many will. It is therefore high time, if only for reasons of national
self-interest, that we add deeds to our words of opposition to apartheid
in South Africa.
Furthermore, our world influence, our aims, and our hope for
security and prosperity rightly are not, and never have been, anchored
on power alone. We proudly proclaim commitment to the moral principles
of our Judeo-Christian heritage. Yet, as our own churches tell us,
the ruling white autocracy of South Africa, while mouthing Christian
doctrine, every day tramples the principles of Christian brotherhood
in the dust. For this reason as well, we should match words with
-19-
deeds. If we do not, we, like the Pharisees, will be fouiI wanting.
The American people will not now or soon support an Ameican naval
blockade of South Africa, and nothing less will bring Dr. Verwoerd down.
But at least we can make our opposition to apartheid clear and credible.
The United States government can best do this by undertaking steps to
discourage American investment in South Africa, as a demonstration to
South Africa and the world that we do not propose to grow rich off the
profits of the economic exploitation and political oppression of
Africans in South Africa. (This is all the more a desirable step to
take at a time when we are engaged in a worldwide effort to right our
balance-of-payments deficit by cutting down American investments abroad.)
With respect to Southwest Africa, we should intensify joint planning
with the United Kingdom, the other Western power involved, for the
contingency of a World Court decision against South Africa and Pretoria's
defiance of it. Our purpose must be to make clear to Dr. Verwoerd that
we will neither support defiance of the rule of law nor contribute to-
ward his doing so with impunity. Furthermore, we must see to it that
the Afro-Asians do not get Soviet support for sanctions against him
without our participation. Southwest Africa, poverty-stricken and
with few educated Africans, needs a United Nations trusteeship; we
should work toward that end.
Africa is not the most important continent for the United States;
Europe is that, and Latin America and Asia thereafter. But Africa is
potentially the most anarchic, the most likely to precipitate race war,
and the most open to Soviet and Chinese subversion; and its strategic
and economic resources and its own weakness prevent us from surrendering
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it to its own fate. Nor can we contain Moscow and Peking, as contain
them we must, in only part of the world: containment must either be
world-wide or it will fail,
Unless and until we need no longer fear Soviet and Chinese expansion-
ism, therefore--and that will be a long time indeed--we are, and should
be, in Africa to stay.
